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Stepping into the 21st century, serious corporation financial fraudulences 
continuously happened in the world. After the waves of financial fraudulences, 
marked with "Sarbanes-Oxley Act", the government regulatory bodies around the 
world have launched a strict supervision, and strengthened corporate governance 
movement. Within this movement, as one of major strategic decision-makings, M&A 
has earned great concern by academics, and scholars have been discussing the 
relationship between corporate governance and the performance of M&A. 
Although domestic scholars have made a lot of meaningful efforts on the topic of 
M&A, the existing literature of M&A relatively focused on the announcement effect 
of M&A and the evaluation of long-term financial performance. Except the two 
dimensions, the relationship among agency problem, corporate governance, and the 
performances of M&A is seldom researched and hasn’t been completely discussed. To 
make up for the deficiencies of the existing research, this paper reviews and analyzes 
the literatures of agent problem, corporate governance, performance evaluation of 
M&A and the effects of agency problems and corporate governance on the 
performance of acquiring firms, in order to establish a theoretical research framework, 
and the research hypotheses to verify. Later, this paper employs 50 corporations from 
the A-share listed companies in China which have implemented M&A transactions in 
2004. With the market model of event study, this paper tests the announcement effects 
of M&A, and employs the financial index study method to verify the change of 
long-term financial performance of acquiring firms. At last the empirical study 
employs Multiple Regression Model to verify the effects of agency problem and 
corporate governance on the short-term and long-term performances of M&A. 
Eventually with the four integrated dimensions, this paper looks forward to show its 
research contribution.  
Through the empirical research, The results of this paper are as follows:1.M&A 
announcement has a significant negative effect on the wealth of acquiring firms’ 















financial performance of acquiring firms has declined after merger; 4.Acquiring firms 
may use M&A transactions to gloss over the financial statements; 5.Ownership 
structure, the proportion of debt financing and other corporate governance variables 
show a significant effect on the announcement effects of M&A; 6.Free cash flow, 
ownership structure, the proportion of independent directors and the proportion of 
debt financing and other corporate governance variables have a significant impact on 
the long-term financial performance of acquiring firms. 
Targeting at potential problems, based on the background of China's capital 
market, this paper provides the following suggestions: 1.To strengthen the protection 
of the legitimate interests of small and medium-sized shareholders; 2.To improve the 
information disclosure system for listed companies; 3.To be Cautious about M&A 
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委托代理理论是由 Wilson（1969）[4]、Spence 和 Zeckhaysen（1971）[5]、
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